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In the Suprente Court
of the State of Utah

In the Matter of the Estate of

)

ROBERT L. PROUDFIT,

Case No.
7405

Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an order fixing the Utah
Inheritance Tax in the above entitled estate and directing payment thereof (R. 40-43). There is no substantial
controversy as to the facts the argument being as to the
legal effect thereof.
Robert L. Proudfit died testate, a resident of Weber
County, State of Utah, on the 14th day of May, 1948.
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His will was duly admitted to probate and Jeanette R.
Proudfit, who was named executrix under the will, qualified and was appointed as executrix (R. 5, 6 and 10).
Robert L. Proudfit left an estate consisting of personal and real property. The real property is located
in Weber County, State of Utah, and consists of three
lots improved with eight small single dwelling houses
and one small duplex dwelling house (R. 0-3). The personal property consists of shares of stock, cash on deposit in banks, and miscellaneous items of personal
property consisting of electric stoves, refrigerators, and
other miscellaneous items (R. 0-3). All of the real and
personal property after the payment of funeral expenseg,
debts and other liabilities of the deceased ·was devised
to Jeannette R. Proudfit, vvho is the executrix herei11.
(R. 7, 8, 11, and 12). For inheritance tax purposes the
gross estate of the decedent was appraised at the sum
of $220,711.58 (R. 18-20).
The executrix filed an inheritance tax return anrl in
such return claimed certain deductions which the court
allO\ved in its order fixing the Utah inheritance tax and
directing payment thereof. It is the contention of the
appellant herein that the court erred in allowing thl•
. following deductions shown on the inheritance tax return ( R. 36 and 37). Those deductions are :
1. $247.75 for garden labor, maintaining and preserving real estate.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. $280.00 for labor and management services on
rented real estate.
3. $33.35 for repars to preserve heating system in
rented real estate.
4. $1,056.17 for heating costs and discharging
decedent's obligation as landlord of rented
real estate.
5. $882.52 for general repairs necessary to maintain and preserve real estate and discharge decedent's obligation.
6. $59.90 for electric power and repairs on stoves
and refrigerators on rented property, in compliance of obligation by decedent as landlord.
7. $133.15 for water charges incident to maintenance and preserving real estate and serving tenants of real property.
·
8. $188.92 for insurance premiums on real estate
improvements and furnishings.
These expenses were incurred after the death of
the decedent and during the administration of the estate,
which required a year and a few weeks, in the operation
of ten rental units, those units being the real property
heretofore referred to (R. 48 and 49). It does not appear from the record that these expenditures were expressly approved by the probate court prior to the time
when they were incurred.
The evidence taken at the hearing on the order to
determine the amount of the l'tah inheritance tax \Ya~
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to the effect that these rental units had been managed
for a period of ten years prior to the death of the decedent by Robert L. Proudfit, Jr., a son of the decedent,
and that since the death of the decedent, Robert L. Proudfit, Jr., has continued to manage these rental un'its for
the executrix (R. 50 and 51). At the time of the decedent's death all ten rental units were rented and for all
practical purposes had been rented during the entire
administration of the estate (R. 51). These ten units
are located on the three lots of real property, which lots
are all adjacent to one another thereby making one lot,
and are arranged about a court, commonly known as
Custer Place or Custer Court. There are lawns and
gardens about the premises and a central heating system which heats all ten units. The court is operated ill
much the same manner as an apartment house, eYen
though they are separate houses, and many of the same
services as are ordinarily furnished to tenants of au
apartment house, are furnished. The lawns and gardens about the court were maintained by the decedent
as landlord. All ten units were heated from a centr<1l
heating system and the cost of furnishing heat has been
assumed by the decedent as landlord. The decedent as
landlord maintained the houses inside and out, cleanin~
the premises at regular intervals, papering, painting
and making repairs to the premises as were necessan·
from time to time. The decedent as landlord furnished
electric stoves and refrigerators, replacing or repairing
them when necessary. The water used by the tenant:~
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was furnished by the decedent. The decedent kept the
real estate and the improvements thereon insured (R.
51-53).
The deductions which are in dispute herein are the
costs of furnishing these various services. The rental
units were operated in the same manner during the administration of the estate as they had been operated for
the last ten years. No services were furnished during
the administration of the estate that it had not been the
custom of the decedent to furnish prior to his death (R.
54-56). There was nothing unusual about the expenses
incurred during administration of the estate as compared with the expenses which arose in the operation
of these units prior to the death of the decedent. The
expenses of furnishing the above services were taken
into account in determining the amount of rents to be
charged on the various units and it does not appear
from the evidence that the rents received during the
administration were not sufficient to pay the cost of
furnishing these services (R. 53, 54 and 55). Nine of
the units rented for $48.75 per month and one unit rented
for $42.50 per month, making a total of $481.25 per
month, or $5,775.00 per year (R. 58).
The amounts received as rentals during the admini~tration of the estate have not bePn included as an asset
of the estate in the inheritance tax return (R. 35-38).
Nor were thPy included in the gross appraised value of
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the estate by the appraisers in determining the value of
real estate at the time of the decedent's death, except that
the appraisers may have considered the rental value of
the property at the time of decedent's death in making
their appraisement (R. 18-20).
The rental units were listed with the Office of Price
Administration of the Federal Government and subject
to the rent control act. At the time the units were registered with the Office of Rent Control the services which
were being furnished by the landlord or decedent, which
are the same as were furnished during the administration of the estate, and which are the same for which deductions are now claimed, were declared and were presumably taken into account by the Office of Rent Control
in arriving at the amount of rent to be charged for eac<1
rental unit (R. 57).
It is further stipulated between counsel for all parties concerned that it has been the practice of the Stat'
Tax Commission of the State of Utah for at least the
last four years to disallow the kind of deductions that
is claimed and in dispute in this estate (R. 59).

STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPOX
The appellant, the State Tax Commission, relies on
the following errors for a reversal of the order appealed
from:
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1.
The court erred in its conclusions of law that the
following sums paid by the executrix for the purposes
hereinafter stated were lawful deductions in determining the net estate of the decedent for inheritance tax
purposes and that Utah inheritance tax should be computed without allowances of such claimed deductions :

1. $247.75 for garden labor, maintaining and preserving real estate.
2. $280.00 for labor and management services on
rented real estate.
3. $33.35 for repairs to preserve heating system
in rented real estate.
4. $1,056.17 for heating costs and discharging decedent's obligation as landlord of rented real
estate.
5. $882.52 for general repairs necessary to maintain and preserve real estate and discharge
decedent's obligation.
6. $59.90 for electric power and repairs on stoves
and refrigerators on rented property, in conlpliance of obligation by decedent as landlord.
7. $133.15 for water charges incident to maintenance and preserving real estate and serving
tenants of real property.
8. $188.92 for insurance premiums on real estate
improvements and furnishings.
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED
The primary question which is before the court for
decision is whether the trial court erred in holding that
all deductions claimed by the executrix are just and
proper deductions.
As we view it the decision in the case depends upon
the answer to the following questions:
(1) Were the deductions set forth 1n the Statement of Errors necessarily incurred in the preservatio11
of the estate and, therefore, deductible as a cost or expense of administration~

(2) Should the expenses claimed be taken out of
rental income produced by reason of such expenditure~!
(3) Are the claimed deductions debts owing by
the decedent at the time of his death~
ARGUMENT

I.
Were the d·eductions set forth in the Statement of
Errors necessarily incurred in the preservation of the
estate and, therefore, deductible as a cost or expense of
administration?

The problem presented in this portion of the arguSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment depends upon the construction to be placed upon
that portion of 80-12-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
which reads as follows:

'' * • • the costs and expenses of administration * * *"
Admittedly an expense incurred in the preservation
of a decedent's estate is a cost of administration and the
representative of an estate incurring such expen::;e
should be allowed to deduct such expense for the purpose of determining the net estate of the decedent for
inheritance tax purposes, but the representative of the
estate has the burden of showing that the expenses wer3
necessarily incurred in good faith for the preservation
of the real property and not for some other purpose.
It is submitted that the court in construing 80-12-8
U. C. A. 1943, should consider the construction placed
upon such statute by the Tax Commission.
It is stipulated by counsel representing the parties
herein that it has been the practice of the Tax Commi~
sion for a period of at least four years, to disallow the
deductions which are claimed and disputed in this
estate (R. 59). There is no further evidence in the
record with regard to how long such interpretation has
bern placed upon thP. statute. Ho·wever, it is submitted
that in no case has the Commission allowed this type of
deduction in computing the net estate of a decedent fo1·
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_12
inheritance tax purposes. Admittedly a misinterpretation of a statute gives no regularity to such interpretation. However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case
of Board of State Land Comntissioners v. Ririe, 56 Utah
213, 190 Pac. 59, said:
"While it is true that the construction of a
statute by the executive department is not binding upon the courts, it is, nevertheless, also true,
and is so determined by the overwhelming weight
of authority, that unless such construction does
violence to the apparent intent of the language
used it is entitled to serious consideration by the
courts, and especially so if the statute has been
in force for any great length of time and has
been so construed.''
This statement of the law \\·as acquiesced in by thi~
court in In re Cowan's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pa•·.
2d 605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utalt Concrete
Products Co. 1-'- State Tax Commission (1942), 101 U.
513, 1:23 Pac. 2d 408, and E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Ta.r
Commission, 168 Pac. 2d 33:2.
The interpretation of the Commission as to what
constitutes "costs of administration" is a pracLeal
interpretation of the statute and certainly does no ,·iolence to an~r apparent intent of the language u~Pd. \V\·,
therefore, submit that such interpn•tatjon is entitled t,)
serious consideration by this court.
Tlw State Tax Commission has no publislw<l reguSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lations setting forth its interpretation of our inheritance
tax law. HoweYer, it is guided, wherever possible, by
regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
~-\

clear definition of administratiYe expenses is
found in Regulation 105 relating to estate tax under the
Internal Revenue Code of the Federal Government, Section 81-32 as follows :
''The amounts deductible from the gross
estate as 'administrative expenses' are such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred
in the administration of the estate; that is, in the
collection of the assets, payment of debts, and
distribution among the persons entitled. The
expenses contemplated by law are such only a8
attend the settlement of an estate by the legal
representative preliminary to the transfer of the
property to the individual beneficiaries or to a
trustee, whether such trustee is an executor or
some other person. Expenditures not essential to
the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred
for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees,
or devisees, may not be taken as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commission, (2) attorney fees, and (3) miscellaneous
expenses." (italics ours)
i\liscellaneous expenses are defined by Section 81-33
of the same regulation as:
''This includes such expenses as court cost;;;,
surrogate's fees, accountants fees, appraisers fees,
clerk hiring, etc. Expenses necessarily incurred
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in preserving and distributing the estate are deductible including the cost of storing or maintaining property of the estate, if it is impossible
to effect immediate distribution to the beneficiaries. Expenses for preserving and care for property may not include outlays for additions or improvements; nor will such expenses be allowed
for a longer period than the executor is required
to retain the property. A brokerage fee for sell-ing property of the estate is deductible if the sale
is necessary in order to pay the decedent's debts,
the expenses of administration or to effect distr:.bution. Other expenses accompanying the sale
are deductible such as the fees of an auctionee~·
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one.''
(italics ours)
''Generally speaking, the expenses of administering a decedent's estate are to be deducted from
the gross value of the estate jn arriving at it~
clear or net value for inheritance tax purposes:
but the rule does not extend to e:xeessive expens(•...;,
nor does it necessarily apply to PYery expenditure
by an executor or administrator, even though tl1~>
expenditure in question is a proper and lcgitillmt•.'
one, allowable as a disbursement on the final settlement of the estate ... " 61 C.•J., Section 259:2,
Page 1704.
.
''An executor or administrator, in the absence
of a statute or will conferring upon him possession or management of the real estate, is under
no duty to make repairs or improvements. \Yhere,
however, under the local administration laws po:-~
session of the realty is vested in a personalrt>presentatiYe, he should preserve the value of the real
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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estate by making necessary repairs. This does
not, in general, mean that he may expend money
in the erection of a new building, but merely that
he may expend it in repairs to the extent necessary to preserve the property. In other words, he
can properly make expenditures for necessary
repairs only . . . " 21 Am. Jur., Executors and
Administrators, Section 294, Page 547.
In discussing Section 7718, Compiled Laws of Utah
1907 which provided among other things that an administrator ''must keep in good tenantable repair all houses,
buildings and fixtures" on real estate under his control
and in discussing Section 7739 which provides "he shall
be allowed all necessary expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate", the Supreme Court
of Utah in the case of In re Hansen's Estate, 55 Utah
23, had this to say on page 41:
''The question of the allowance for improvements must be determined from the facts in each
particular case, bearing in mind that such improvements must be proven to have been reasonably necessary and made in good faith for the
benefit of the estate.''
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah,
September 28, 1945, In re Smith's Estate, Davies ""·
Rmith, et al, 162 Pacific 2d 105, the facts are as follows:
Elias ~I. Smith died October 22, 1937, leaYing an estate
consisting principally of two farms "Thich "Tere located
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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about 165 miles west of Fillmore, Utah. By the terms
of the will \Villiam B. Davies, son-in-law to the deceased,
was named to act as executor without bond. He was
directed to: "rent or operate my main ranch at Garrison, Utah, (at present consisting of 160 acres) and seil
the estate's share of the crop after retaining enough for
feed and seed and after paying taxes, insurance, and
other essentional expenses of the ranch (including taxes,
and insurance on my present home or house and four
acres) shall turn over to my wife, Mary H. Smith, these
net proceeds of the ranch for her own personal needs.''
''The executor in his individual capacity owned
a ranch in the immediate vicinity of the estate
farms. He operated, with his brother, a large
number of cattle and had some grazing permits
on public domain. His operation of the estate
lands was closely allied with the operation of his
own lands. He, without court approval, leased
the estate's farm to himself in 1938, 1939, and
1940. During other years he personally purchased
the produce from the estate's farm. He purchased
lun1ber for the purpose of building feed racks on
the estate's farm and then used those racks in
the feeding of his own livestock. "\Vhen the farm
was leased to third persons he failed to get approval of the lease. Men hired to work on the
estate's farm were also, during substantially the
same period, employed by him to work on his own
lands ... The record does not show that the executor was guilty of overreaching in his dealings
with the estate, but it does show that he thoroughly mixed his own personal business with that
of the estate.''
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"\Yhen the executor filed his account with the court
certain expendtiures were questioned. Among others
were $9.68 for 48 fence posts for the upkeep of tht=J
premises and $14.00 to Chester Hornbeck for wire foe
the premises. The district court disallowed these items ·
and the Supreme Court refused to change the ruling,
quoting the case of In re Hansen's Estate (previously
cited), holding that since he failed to get approval from
the court for the capital improvements, the burden
should be on him to show that they were for the benefit
of the estate. (Which he had not done.)
Thus it will be seen that in order for an item to be
deductible as an administrative expense upon the theory
that the expense was incurred for the preservation of
thr assets of the estate, the person claiming the deduction must bear the burden of showing that the expense~
W(·re incurred for the qenefit of the estate and not the
heirs, legatees or devisees, and the expenses must be
prm·en to have been necessary and made in good faith
for the benefit of the estate. In this case there is absolutely no proof that the expenses incurred ·were nece~.:;
~nr~·.
In fact, it affirmatively appears that some
charges, such as the charge of maintaining the temperature in the rental units at 72°, were not such items as
would be necessarily incurred in the preservation of an
estate and could not under any circumstances have benefitrd the estate. :Moreover, we must keep in mind that
the rental units in connection with which these charges
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were incurred produced an income in the amount of
$481.25 per month, or $5,775.00 per year, which income
is far greater than the expenses incurred during the
same period of time. Therefore, it affirmatively appearR
that the expenses were not incurred primarily for the
benefit of the estate, but were incurred in the production of rental income, and that they are, therefore, not
administrative expenses.

II.
Should the expenses claim·ed be taken out of rental
income produced by reason of such expenditures?
An old case directly in point is the Colorado ca..;~
of People vs. Palmer's Estate, found at 139 Pacific 55-t,
25 Colo. app. 450, decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In that case the court was construing the following
statute:
''All property, real, personal and mixed, which
shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of thls
state from any person who may die seised or possessed of the same while a resident of this state,
... shall be and is, subject to a tax at the rate
hereinafter specified to be paid to the treasurer
of the proper county for the use of the state and
all heirs, legatees and devisees, administrators,
executors and trustees shall be liable for any ann
all such taxes until the same shall have been paid
·as hereinafter directed . . . ''
\Vhile this statute does not provide for deduction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of administrative expenses, the court in discussing this
statute said:
''Everything bequeathed or devised passes to
the heir, and nothing is deducted from that which
passes, or ought to be deducted; not even the
debts of the decedent or expenses of administration are deducted from that which passes, but in
contemplation of the law, before the passin.~
takes place, as nothing can pass until the debts
are paid, including the debts of the estate, such
as expenses of administration. The statute says
that the tax is to be paid on the value of everything that passes by the will or the law, and not
on what the heir actually receives, although it
makes no difference because the heir actually
receives everything that is bequeathed or devised;
nothing can be devised or bequeathed except what
is left after the obligations of the decedent and
expenses of administration are paid.''
Thus it appears that the court had in mind that
administrative expenses should be deducted before the
tax i~ levied even though the statute did not specifically
~o provide. In spite of this language the court refused
to allo\Y a deduction of $25,000 expended by the executor~ during the administration for the "upkeep" of th•3
home of the deec-'dent and said:
''The $25,000 item is so clearly a charge
against the devisees expended to preserve the
property devised to them, and which, as provided
by the statute, vested in them and to be appraised
of as of the time of death, that reference to it is
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not necessary except as it may be involved in discussion of the other item.'' (Inheritance tax
levied by a foreign state).
While it is believed that this case goes a little far,
it is believed that it announces the principle which should
be controlling in this case. That is, that in this case since
the devisee of the property, the executrix, has received
the rent accruing on the real property since the death
of the decedent, which rents have not been included in
the assets of the estate, the deductions claimed herein
should be paid by the executrix from the rental income
received from the property.
Section 101-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1943, prL>vides:
"In a specific devise or legacy the title passes
by the will, but possession can only be obtained
from the personal representative; and he may be
authorized by the court to sell the property d£:vised and bequeathed in the cases herein provided.''
Thus the real property in this case passed to tlw
devisee immediately following the death of the decedent
and she was entitled to the property, and the income of
the property, subject to any control the probate court
might assert over the property.
In this regard the following is found in 32 Am. Jur.,
Landlord and Tenant, Section 448, Page 364:
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''As a general rule, since rent to accrue is an
incident of the reversion, upon the death of a
lessor, who had reserved rent g-enerally for the
duration of the term, rents thereafter to accrue
and to become payable either in money or in a
share of the crops raised upon the premises do
not devolve upon his executor or administrator
for administration as a part of his personal estate,
but descend at once, with the reversion, as real
estate, to his heirs at law, or pass to the devisees
who are entitled under his will to the reversion,
unless otherwise disposed of by will ... However,
the right of an heir or devisee to future rent, as
an incident of the reversion, is subject to charges
upon the premises, to the payment of taxes upon
the property, even though they were assessed
prior to his acquisition of title, to homestead
rights, and to whatever claim the surviving spouse
of the lessor can assert in the premises by way
of a right to dower or to a statutory distributive
share in his estate. :Moreover, as hereinafter
stated, the rule which awards future rents to the
heir or devisee of the lessor has been modified by
Rtatutes which permit the personal representative
to take the rents unconditionally as in some jurisdictions, and for the payment of debts or for
other specified purpose in other jurisdictions, and
by statutes which provide for the sale of the real
estate left by a decedent, in order to pay his
debts . . . "
''It appears that a personal representative in
accounting for rents collected by him as an agent
for the heirs or devisees should be allowed a
credit for payrnents made by him for taxes, insurance pre1niun1s, interest on encumbrances, and
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expenses of repairs, and that he should be entitled to retain :a reasonable amount for his own
compensation in looking after the rents and the
premises, at least where he acted in these respects
with the knowledge and consent of the heirs or
devisees.''
At 31 A. L. R., Page 27, appears an annotation of
\he various states as to who is entitled to rent accruing
after the death of the landlord, and in all 23 jurisdictions
cited the cases hold that in the absence of a provision
in the will to the contrary the devisees under the will
are entitled to receive the rents of the estate subject to
any debts against the estate at the time of the death
of the devisor.
The question as to what expenses should be taken
from the corpus of an estate and what expenses should
be taken from the income of an estate has arisen in
many cases involving a dispute between those persons
entitled to the principal of the estate and those entitled
to the income of an estate. The case of Commercial Xational Bank of Charlotte vs. Charles A. Misenheimer
and J. J. Misenheimer, appearing at 110 A. L. R. 1310
was an action brought by the executor for a con~truc
tion and interpretation of the will of the testator. At
the time of his death the testator owned four tracts of
land as a tenant in common with Charles A. ~~ i~en
heimer, one of the defendants. It appeared that the
testator left personal property sufficient to pay all perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sonal debts exclusive of those secured by deeds of trust
on the real property. The lower court had made an order
authorizing the executor, among other things, to collect
one-half of the rents from the devised real estate, to
keep a separate account, and to pay therefrom the pro
rata share of the testator's estate for repairs, taxes,
insurance, and interest on the mortgage indebtedness.
The Supreme Court, in ruling on this question said:
"While ordinary rents collected by the executor from the devised property would go to the
devisee, the order from Harding, J ., authorizing
the application of collection of rents to repairs,
taxes, insurance and mortgage indebtedness on
the particular tracts from which the rents were
derived, would not be injurious to the interest
of the appellant and his exception to the order is
without substantial merit.''
In the case of Spring vs. Hollander, a Massachusetts case found at 158 N. E. 791, which involved a peti-·
tion 1,)- a trustee appointed by the probate court to sell
the lands of an estate, the question arose whether the
taxes on the realty should be paid by th.e life tenant or
should be deducted from the selling price of the land
before the principal should be paid to the residuary
legatee. The court decided that the ordinary taxes on
the realty are to be paid by the life tenant and in doing
so quoted the following from Wiggin vs. Swett, 6 :Mete
194, at Page 201 (39 Amdec 716):
"Taxes are properly payable out of the rent
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and income of real estate and therefore constitut~
a proper charge upon those who have the actual
and beneficial use and enjoyment of the estate
for the time being, whether it be in fee, for life,
or for years.''
In the case of Mahoney vs. Kearins, a Massachusett~
case found at 184 N. E. 686, which arose upon a petition
of the trustee for instructions as to what funds should
be used to pay the taxes on real estate in which a life
estate was devised to the daughters of the deceased, the
following appears:
"In the first case under paragraph 13 of the
will the trustee is directed to hold the premises
described therein in trust for the benefit of certain named daughters, 'with power on the part
of my said daughters to occupy said homestead,
according to the requirements set forth in paragraph 20 of this will'. It is plain that under thi:;
power the daughters named were given a beneficial interest in the homestead analogous to an
equitable life estate. Assuming that power wn~
exercised by any one of the daughters and that
such an election created an equitable life e:-;tate
in the ·donee, the rule is applicable, unless thr
will directs otherwise, that taxes, insurance, repairs and all incidental expenses of the ordinary
maintenance of real estate held in the trust shall
be borne by the life tenant. Taxes (insurance and
repairs) are properly payable out of the rent and
income of real estate, and therefore constitute r.
proper charge upon those who had the actual and
beneficial use and enjoyment of the estate for
the time being.''
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In re Jacob's Estate, 2 N. Y. S. 2d, 973, the decedent
had bequeathed a sum of $3,000.00 to her executors in
trust to be expended for a college course for her granddaughter with the provision that in the event that said
granddaughter refused or was unable to pursue such
course before she arrived at the age of 25 the $3,000.00
was to be paid to someone other than the granddaughter.
The court of appeals had directed that the income from
said trust fund be paid to the granddaughter, Ruth
Jacobs, until she became 25 years of age, and that in the
event she failed to qualify and take the principal sum,
said sum of $3,000.00 should be paid to Clara Augusta
Traver. Ruth Jacobs failed to qualify and the principal
of the trust fund belongs to the appellant. The appeal
was taken from an order of the court assessing a tax
upon the interest of Clara Augusta Traver without certain deductions and claims first being deducted from the
principal sum before the net sum on which tax deducted
from the principal sum was arrived at. Among the items
claimed to be deducted were the trustee's commission on
the income derived from the trust fund, the attorney
fees and costs and disbursements in proceedings instituted by the trustee to determine the rights of Ruth
Jacobs and Clara Augusta Traver. The court held:
''The trustee's commission on the income derived fr01n the trust fund is not deductible . . .
The allowances for attorney's fees to Ruth Jacobs
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ian of $403.45, are clearly not deductible, as these
are personal expenditures by the beneficiaries of
the sums sought to be deducted for the benefit of
their respective estates."
In discussing the matter of attorney fees the court
said:
''However, in this case the proceedings were
instituted by the trustee appointed under the
eighth paragraph of the will of the decedent and
did not involve the whole estate of the testatrix
but simply the rights of Ruth Jacobs and the
appellant, Clara Augusta Traver, to the trust fund
thereby bequeathed. The expenditures made by
the trustee were for the benefit of these two
beneficiaries alone and did not involve the whoJe
estate. Under these circumstances these sums art!
not deductible . . .
" ... It may be stated as a general rule that
expenses of litigation in conserving and preserving the corpus of the estate are proper deductions
before the assessment of the tax; but the expenses
of litigation by the distributees over their respective interests, which does not in any manner affert
the size of the amount of the estate originally
passing, should not be so deducted.''
It is submitted that in the case at bar the real property of the decedent passed to the devisee, who in this
case is also the executrix, immediately upon the death
of the decedent subject to the payment of any expenses
of the estate or claims against the estate in the event
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the other assets of the estate were not sufficient to take
care of these expenses or claims; that immediately upon
the death of the decedent the devisee became entitled to
the income produced by the rental property in question
after the death of the decedent, subject to the limitations already mentioned; that since the devisee was
entitled to the income of the rental property, that is, the
beneficial use, she should pay the costs of repairs, insurance, taxes, and other incidental expenses of the ordinary maintenance of real estate. That the deductions
claimed herein fall within that classification and should,
therefore, be paid out of the income. That since the deductions claimed herein should have been paid out of
the income produced by the rental property, they should
not be deducted from the corpus of the estate, especially
since none of the income derived has been included in
the corpus of the estate upon which the tax in question
is levied.

III.
Are the claimed deductions debts owing by the decedent at the time of his death?

Although it does not appear from the evidence that
there were any rent agreements or leases, except on a
month to month basis, in effect at the time of the dece(lent ':-; death, which had not yet expired, even assuming this to be the case, it is submitted that any such
leases do not constitute an obligation which falls withiu
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the definition of a debt owing by the decedent at the
time of his death for two reasons. First, the leases, if
any, cease to he an obligation of the estate and becom~~
the obligation of the devisee of the real proper~y, and
second, the obligation is not a debt.
"In the absence of a covenant otherwise providing, as a general rule a lease is not terminated
by the death of the lessor or the lessee. The rule
may be altered, however, by st~.tute and the terms
of the lease may be such as to terminate it on the
death of the lessor ... " 51 C. J. S., Section 92,
Page 659.
''On the death of the landlord, his tenant continues in the same relation to those who are b)·
law entitled to succeed to the rights of the decedent until his disclaimer of such relation is
made known to them, although, where one entitled
to a part interest has leased the entire estate, a
person who at the lessors death becomes entitled
to the entire estate may hold the lessee as his
tenant only as to the part interest to which the
lessor was entitled." 51 C. J. S., Section 22d,
Page 527.
In the case of Dobbelaar vs. Hughes, a New J erse~·
case decided at 156 Atlantic 469, an action to quiet title
brought by a tenant against the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, it was held that the tenant, by remaining
in possession of the premises after the death of the
intestate landlord became the heir's tenant by operation
of law.
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In the case of ~fain Ys. Norman, 36 Atl. 2d 256, it
was held that a land owner could not maintain an action
against a deceased adjoining owner's estate for damage;;
for failure to erect and maintain one-half of a division
fence where plaintiff admitted that the fence was in
good order at the tin1e of the adjoining owner's death
and claimed that losses resulting to him occurred afterwards from losses of sheep and loss of use of land since
neither loss could afford basis of claim against the estate
or suit against administrator as such.
The following definition of debt is taken from Hodgson vs. :Jiarks, 300 N. Y. S. 661, 664; 165 Misc. 680:
"The word 'debt' comes from the Latin 'dehere', meaning to owe; 'debitum' meaning something owed. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's
third rev.) at page 786, defines it as a sum of
money due by certain and express agreement; all
that is due a man under any form of obligation
or promise.''
''The distinguishing ·and necessary feature of
a debt is that a fixed and specific amount is owing,
and no future valuation is required to settle it.''
In the case of Eckenrock's Will, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 582;
Hi7 l\Iisc. 632, the issue was as follows: At the date of
his death, which occurred August 6, 1934, the decedent
was the owner of certain real property at 97 Warwick
Street, Brooklyn. Taxes against this property had been
levied and finally determined for the year 1934 in the
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total sum ·of $528.28 of which $2·64.14 became due and
payable on April 1, 1934, and the latter sum on October
1, 1934. The widow, to whom the property was devised,
paid the sum which fell due on October 1st, presented a
claim therefore to the executors, and objects to their
accounts by reason of its rejection. The court held that
an installment of a real estate tax which did not become
a debt until the date when it became due and payable
was not a "debt" of decedent who died subsequent to
the levy but prior to the date on which the installment
was due, and hence executors were not required to reimburse devisee of property who paid installment when
it fell due.
We may conclude from the foregoing that upon the
death of the testator in this case the devisee stepped into
his shoes as landlord and that thereafter the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased to exist between any
lessre -of the property and the decedent. Since there does
not appear to have been any viol~ation of any rental
agreement prior to the decedent's death, and since the
deductions claimed herein arose in the performance of
leases after the decedent's death, when he had ceased to
be the landlord, the claimed deductions were not ''debts
of the decedent owing at the time of his death.''
CONCLUSION
It appears, therefore, that the deductions claimed
herein should not have been allowed for the reason that
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they do not fall within the definitions of any deductions
which may be allowed ~nder Section 80-12-7 or 80-12-8,
Utah Code Annotated 1943. They are not administrative
expenses incurred for the preservation of the estate for
the reason that they do not meet the primary test for
preservation expenses. That is, they were not incurred
in good faith for the benefit of the estate, but rather were
incurred for the benefit of the devisee under the will in
producing rental income, to which, as we have seen,
the devisee was entitled, and performing the devisee's
obligations as landlord to the tenants of the real property. Moreover, since the rental income during the time
in which the expenses were incurred is more than sufficient to pay the expenses of the real property on which
the rental income is received, the devisee, receiving the
benefit of the income, should pay the expenses of producing the income.
Finally, it appears that the obligation of the landlord to the tenants passed to the devisee, by reason of
the devisee's accepting the benefits of such relationships,
and thereby became the obligation of the devisee. That
the executor in furnishing the services for which the
deductions are claimed, was not discharging any obligation of the decedent, but the obligation of the devisee.
And furthermore, that any obligation of the decedent to
the tenant existing at the time of his death was not a
debt due upon the death of the decedent as defined by
the statutes for the reason that there was nothing owing.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. 32

There was not even a claim against the decedent at the
time of his death by any tenant for the reason that he
had not failed to perform any part of his obligation
prior to his death, and therefore, there is no cause of
action existing against him at the time of his death.
Even were this true, any such claim has not been adjudicated or reduced to an amount certain as the l~aw seems
to require.
It is therefore the contention of the appellant herein
that the court erred in allowing the deductions herein
set out before arriving at the amount on which the inheritance tax was charged.
WHEREFORE, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED that the judgment of the lower court should
be reversed and the case remanded ·with directions to
disallow the deductions claimed by the executrix and
disputed by the Tax Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
G. I-IAL TAYLOR
DON J. HANSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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